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1Challenges in Confronting Pandemic Influenza 
Using Novel Adjuvanted Vaccines
2Pandemic Influenza
• Epidemiologic characteristics:
• High attack rates across broad age ranges
• Rapid geographic spread
• Variable mortality (but low as many plagues go)
• Extremes of age and pregnancy impose high risk
• Fatal disease predominantly pulmonary
• Short, explosive outbreaks in populous areas, that may 
recur in “waves”
• Virologic characteristics:
• Causative viruses with which a large proportion of the 
human population then-living has no immunologic 
experience
• Persons old enough to have experienced pandemic 
subtypes earlier in life often spared.
• Pandemic viruses often (not always) displace older 
subtypes
3Origin of Pandemic Influenza Viruses
• 16 HA subtypes and 9 NA 
subtypes harbored by aquatic 
birds
• 3 HA subtypes and 2 NA 
subtypes have become stably 
endemic in humans
• Known sources of pandemics 
include
• Direct invasion of an avian 
virus (1918),
• Return of an old HA subtype 
by re-assortment  when 
enough humans are 
susceptible (?1957, 1968, 
now 2009)
4Amplitude of the Pandemic Threat and Control 
Measures
• Mortality may be massive, but not all pandemics are 
horrific:
• 1918 “Spanish” flu – 40 to 50 M deaths
• 1957 “Asian” flu – 1 to 2 M deaths
• 1968 “Hong Kong” flu – 1 M deaths
• 1977 “Lab accident flu” – little excess mortality
• Our array of control measures is now greater:
• Social distancing and non-pharmaceutical control measures 
were available in 1918, but better understood now
• Anti-virals are new on the scene
• Potential for rapid evolution 
of resistance
• Vaccines
5Waves of Pandemic Virus Transmission and Disease
UK, 1918-19
MayAprilMarch
Severe influenza in Haskell County KS
Outbreaks at multiple US Army camps
Mortality spikes in 30 of 50 largest US cities, influenza in France
7 months
Tauenberger JK, Morens DM.  Emerging Infect Dis 2006;12:15-22
Barry JM.  J. Translat Med 2004; 2:3
6The Promise of Vaccine for Pandemic Control
Germann et al. PNAS 2006;103:5935-40
No intervention:
• Introduction at 14 US 
airports (one in every 
2500 infected; Ro = 1.9)
• 85 days to peak of 
epidemic
• ~ 4 M new cases per day 
at peak
• 43% attack rate
Or:
• Vaccination starts within 
2 weeks
• 10 M doses / week
• Only 30% efficacy
• <10% attack rate
7The Vaccine Problem
• In 2009, world annual capacity for production of 
TIV was estimated by WHO at 876 M doses, up 
from about 350 M in 2006.a 
• Assuming a monovalent at the same, single antigen 
dose as in TIV, that’s roughly 53 M doses per week –
once it starts to become available
• If the virus gives us 7 months from appearance to a 
major wave of disease as in 1918 (in 2009 it was more 
like 6), and
• It takes about 3 months to get the first egg-derived 
doses out, and 4 months for significant quantities (and in 
fact it did in 2009), then 
• Vaccine production is sufficient to immunize only a small 
% of the population at risk in time to intervene in the 
major peak of the pandemic.
8GSK’s Approach to Pandemic Vaccine: 2009
1. Enhance doses available by using an 
antigen-sparing tocopherol-based oil-in-
water adjuvant system, AS03.
2. Using the same adjuvant strategy, seek 
to enhance cross-reactive immunity, 
thereby providing a basis for:
a. Stockpiling in advance of a pandemic, or
b. Pre-pandemic priming of select populations
Approach 2 remains to be tested; but 
approach 1 was tested in 2009.
9The Threat We Prepared For:
• From 2003 to present, highly pathogenic H5N1 
viruses have spread from SE Asia, causing 
damage to local poultry industries, directly and as a 
result of control measures.
• Fortunately, these viruses have remained 
extremely inefficient in human-to-human 
transmission.
• Since 2003 there have been 498 cases with 294 
deaths (case fatality rate 59%) worldwide
• 30 cases and 12 deaths in 2010, primarily in Egypt and 
Viet Nam, virtually all associated with direct contact with 
sick poultry*.
*WHO Avian influenza update 6 May 10
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H5N1 Antigens and AS03
• GSK began clinical trials with 
AS03-adjuvanted H5N1 
antigens in 2005.
• Marked antigen-sparing 
shown:
• Strong HI responses at 3.8 
μg HA exceeded those 
obtainable with 30 μg without 
adjuvant
• Exceeded all reg. criteria for 
SCR, SPR, and fold-increase 
in HI titer.
• Persistent antibody titers at 6 
months.
• Essentially identical responses 
obtained with both GSK 
antigen manufacturing 
processes
• Antigen-sparing shown with 
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H5N1/AS03A pandemic vaccine has shown a 
broad and persistent immune response
Two immunisations at day 1 and day 21 with H5N1 A/Vietnam/1194/04 split virus, AS03A






























H5N1 Antigens and AS03
• Demonstration of both 
homologous and 
cross-clade serum 
neutralizing titers in 
humans (upper 
panel), and
• Homologous virus 
and cross-clade 
protection against 
mortality and virus 
replication in ferrets 
immunized with 
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Mortality and Lung Viral Load in A/Viet Nam-Immunized 
Ferrets challenged with A/Indonesia
Sources: PLoS One 2008;3(1):e1401
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Safety of AS03-adjuvanted H5N1 Vaccines
• > 16,000 subjects in clinical trials to date, some 
ongoing
• Short-term reactogenicity:
• Increased frequency of local pain at the injection site 
relative to TIV or unadjuvanted H5 antigens,
• Some increase in uncomplicated fever in young 
children in a limited experience.
• > 95% compliance with 2nd dose
• Aside from reactogenicity as above, no alteration 
in overall profile of adverse events, medically-
attended adverse events, or serious adverse 
events relative to TIV or placebo controls.
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The Result of the H5N1 Efforts: GSK’s 
HxNx/AS03 Pandemic Influenza Vaccines
• Monovalent, vaccine strain 
recommended by WHO
• Std dose is 3.75µg HA administered 
twice, 21 days apart
• 10-dose Ag vial w/ thimerosal 
preservative
• 10-dose AS03 adjuvant vial 
• Mixed prior to injection
EMEA approved GSK’s Dresden H5N1/AS03 vaccine May 2008  
(for interpandemic use)
Also issued a “mock-up” authorization permitting rapid licensure of a 
similar vaccine w/ a new pandemic strain upon submission of technical 
& limited clinical data
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And then Came Pandemic 2009
• Initial ARI outbreak late Feb.
• 17 April 09: CDC reports illness 
in 2 children with a novel swine 
origin virus.
• 23 April 09: ARI syndromes in 
Mexico, including deaths, with 
same virus confirmed.
• Subsequent course is 
explosive, although disease 
overall mild.
• The virus was not what we had 
been preparing for (because 
we had forgotten our history 
lessons).












































































A lineal descendant of the 1918 virus, without the human drift
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Challenges of 2009-10
• A large and compressed clinical trials effort.
• Do the immunogenicity and safety lessons of H5N1 
apply to A/California/07/09?
• Is the adjuvant still needed for an H1N1?
• Clarifying the regulatory pathways?
• Fairly clear in the EU
• Elsewhere – not so much.
• Can you adequately monitor safety of many million 
doses given in a matter of weeks to a few months?
• Will safety prove limiting?
• Ferrets are nice, but will it work in the real world?
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GSK Clinical Trials of A/California/7/09 Vaccines
• Complexity of the challenge increased by:
• Two manufacturing sites with two different antigen manufacturing 
processes →
• Pandemrix – Dresden site, Fluarix process
• Arepanrix – Quebec site, Fluviral (FluLaval) process
• Varying approaches and requests of multiple regulatory 
authorities
• Need to examine adjuvanted and unadjuvanted vaccines to 
understand if the lessons of H5 carried forward.
• GSK clinical trials of A/California vaccines began 
approximately 3 months after receipt of the seed virus.
• To date, the GSK Clinical Trial Registry lists results from          
> 3,600 subjects in 16 trials of A/California/7/09 vaccines, 
spanning 6 months of age to the elderly.
• Almost 20,000 additional subjects remain on study in 
continuing RCTs and observational studies sponsored or 
supported by GSK.
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Immunogenicity in Adults: with and without AS03





D-H1N1-007: HI results 
after one and two doses in adults 18 years – 60 years
H1N1 3.75 μg HA + AS03A vs. H1N1 15 μg HA alone
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Local Reactogenicity in Adults
All the data of the D-H1N1-007 study can be found on the ‘Clinical Study Register’ Available at:
http://www.gsk-clinicalstudyregister.com/files/pdf/27783.pdf
D-H1N1-007: local reactogenicity 









Systemic Reactogenicity in Adults
All the data of the D-H1N1-007 study can be found on the ‘Clinical Study Register’ Available at:
http://www.gsk-clinicalstudyregister.com/files/pdf/27783.pdf
D-H1N1-007: general reactogenicity 









Q-H1N1-003: HI response after one dose 




























after one dose in children 6 months – 6 years
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Systemic Reacotgenicity in Children
www.gsk-clinicalstudyregister.com
Q-H1N1-003: general reactogenicity  









*Fever in 30% after second adult dose (3.75 + AS03A), 
but no increase in half-dose group
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Independent Confirmation of Immunogenicity, 
Safety in Children.
• 1.9 μg of HA + AS03B (half 
the adult dose) more 
immunogenic than whole-
virion, cell culture-derived 
vaccine containing 7.5 μg 
of HA, both in two dose 
regimen.
• Some increase in local pain 
relative to unadjuvanted 
vaccine, but little severe
• Some increase in fever 
after dose 2, but less 
prominent than in GSK’s  
studies




• GSK had productive and efficient interactions with regulatory 
authorities throughout:
• Interactions at least weekly throughout second half of 2009
• Alignment on reagents, rapid e-mail submissions accepted.
• The existence of the EU mock-up authorization for Pandemrix (the 
product of GSK’s Dresden facility) facilitated European approval on 
29 Sept 09.
• Authorization for sale of Arepanrix (the Quebec product) on 21 Oct 
09, based on:
• Prior review by BGTD of H5N1 safety and immunogencity, and 
evolving Pandemrix data
• Weekly follow-up of Arepanrix clinical trials data as they evolved.
• US regulatory guidance focused on unadjuvanted vaccine 
(although HHS did fund trials of adjuvanted vaccine)
• IND studies began in October
• GSK’s strain change supplement for unadjuvanted vaccine accepted 
10 November.
• All authorities collaborated with GSK in the iterative revision of 
labeling as clinical trials data accumulate.
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Exposures to GSK H1N1v AS03-containing 
vaccines in mass vaccination (as of 19 May 2010)
• It is our understanding that GSK’s H1N1- AS03 vaccines 
have been administered in 57 countries.
• The total number of doses distributed cumulatively:
• for Pandemrix (D-Pan), 147 million doses 
• for Arepanrix (Q-Pan), the total number delivered is 148 million doses
• Current estimates are that:
• at least an estimated 89 million doses have been administered
• at least 4.3 million doses to children and 
• at least 430,000 doses in pregnant women have been administered
T 1 GSK’s estimate compiled with data from local affiliates
the figures presented here have been estimated based on GSK data on file, and data provided by national health authorities
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Pharmacovigilance Reports: Arepanrix
• Public Health Agency of Canada Vaccine Surveillance Report of 27 
April 2010*
• 25.1 M doses of 3 H1N1 vaccines distributed, great majority 
Arepanrix
• 25.9 adverse events, including 1.1 serious adverse events per 100K 
doses distributed.
• Overall rate of AEs increased relative to prior seasonal campaigns, 
but not serious AEs (avg. 1 per 100K doses distributed in prior 
seasons).
• Rate of anaphylaxis = 0.53 per 100K doses distributed; “does not 
exceed the normal range observed after receiving any vaccine.”
• “Concerns about GBS have not emerged.”
• “No safety concerns regarding H1N1 vaccines given to pregnant 
women have been identified….”
• Preliminary analyses of independent pediatric data from PHAC 
Influenza Research Network trial do not show increased 




• EMA 18th pandemic pharmacovigilance update – 20 May 
2010*
• At least 131.7 M doses distributed in EEA, ≥ 30.6 M persons 
vaccinated
• 10,963 reports: 8.32 per 100 K doses distributed
• “The benefit-risk balance of the centrally authorized pandemic 
vaccines and anti-virals for the current H1N1 influenza 
pandemic continues to be positive.”
• Prior updates analyzed, and found no evidence for excess 
incidence or vaccine causation of:
• Anaphylaxis
• GBS or other demyelinating disorders
• ITP or autoimmune thrombocytopenia
• Conclusions unchanged at most recent update.
*EMA/326582/2010
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Is There Evidence that It Worked?
• At this point, there are no RCT data concerning efficacy.
• GSK has ongoing RCTs in adults and children to assess relative 
efficacy of adjuvanted and unadjuvanted vaccines.
• Multiple effectiveness studies, using various methods, are now in 
analysis.  Wichmann, et al* report the first of these:
• Methodology contains multiple key assumptions and probably 
represents a maximum estimate, but results are encouraging.
* Eurosurveillance 2010; 15(18) pii=19561
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Challenges of 2009-10
• Do the immunogenicity and safety lessons of H5N1 apply to 
A/California/07/09?
• The lessons of H5N1 were helpful.
• Only 1 dose needed, but AS03 remains 4 to 8-fold dose-sparing.  
Responses strong in young children, adults and elders (not shown).
• Reactogenicity is increased, but tolerable
• Fever may be a concern in a two-dose regimen in children -TBD
• No other salient findings in RCTs to date.
• An unprecedented clinical trials effort.
• Well, yes.
• Is the adjuvant still needed for an H1N1?
• It is clearly possible to immunize with 15 μg or even 7.5 μg of plain 
A/California/7/09 HA, but
• Antibody titers (and CD4+ T cell responses) are greater and more rapid 
with adjuvant.
• Using AS03 has allowed GSK to distribute an >250 million doses of 
adjuvanted pandemic H1N1 vaccine.
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Challenges of 2009-10
• Clarifying the regulatory pathways?
• The European Core Dossier (mock-up file) approach worked 
pretty well; a pre-existing plan clearly helped.
• Canadian regulators likewise leveraged prior review of a 
“rolling NDS” for H5N1 pandemic vaccine
• All regulators worked hard with sponsors to find paths 
forward, to adjust labeling on the fly as data became 
available, and to address product issues in real time.
• Can you adequately monitor safety of many million 
doses given in a matter of weeks to a few months?
• Yes, using a (large) dedicated team
• Pharmacovigilance results to date show no limiting safety 
issues with AS03-adjuvanted pandemic vaccines.
• Ferrets are nice, but will it work in the real world?
• Preliminary results say yes – much more to come.
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Other Lessons:
• We were too late, but not by much, and not 
everywhere.
• What were the other lessons to take away for 
next time?
• Continued enhancements in surveillance are key.
• SRID reagents remain on the critical path – new 
methods of quantitation could save a month.
• Once antigen production is ramped up, fill and 
finish was a bottleneck.
• Matching supply to demand through dozens of 
rapidly evolving contracts with numerous 
governments was inefficient. 
